Files
nats-server/server/auth_callout.go
2023-01-02 17:18:45 -08:00

360 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2022-2023 The NATS Authors
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package server
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2"
"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
)
const (
AuthCalloutSubject = "$SYS.REQ.USER.AUTH"
AuthRequestSubject = "nats-authorization-request"
AuthRequestXKeyHeader = "Nats-Server-Xkey"
)
// Process a callout on this client's behalf.
func (s *Server) processClientOrLeafCallout(c *client, opts *Options) (authorized bool, errStr string) {
isOperatorMode := len(opts.TrustedKeys) > 0
var acc *Account
if !isOperatorMode && opts.AuthCallout != nil && opts.AuthCallout.Account != _EMPTY_ {
aname := opts.AuthCallout.Account
var err error
acc, err = s.LookupAccount(aname)
if err != nil {
errStr = fmt.Sprintf("No valid account %q for auth callout request: %v", aname, err)
s.Warnf(errStr)
return false, errStr
}
} else {
acc = c.acc
}
// Check if we have been requested to encrypt.
var xkp nkeys.KeyPair
var xkey string
var pubAccXKey string
if !isOperatorMode && opts.AuthCallout != nil && opts.AuthCallout.XKey != _EMPTY_ {
pubAccXKey = opts.AuthCallout.XKey
} else if isOperatorMode {
pubAccXKey = acc.externalAuthXKey()
}
// If set grab server's xkey keypair and public key.
if pubAccXKey != _EMPTY_ {
// These are only set on creation, so lock not needed.
xkp, xkey = s.xkp, s.info.XKey
}
// Create a keypair for the user. We will expect this public user to be in the signed response.
// This prevents replay attacks.
ukp, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
pub, _ := ukp.PublicKey()
reply := s.newRespInbox()
respCh := make(chan string, 1)
processReply := func(_ *subscription, rc *client, racc *Account, subject, reply string, rmsg []byte) {
_, msg := rc.msgParts(rmsg)
// This signals not authorized.
// Since this is an account subscription will always have "\r\n".
if len(msg) <= LEN_CR_LF {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Auth callout violation: %q on account %q", "no reason supplied", racc.Name)
return
}
// Strip trailing CRLF.
msg = msg[:len(msg)-LEN_CR_LF]
// If we sent an encrypted request the response could be encrypted as well.
if xkp != nil && len(msg) > len(jwtPrefix) && !bytes.HasPrefix(msg, []byte(jwtPrefix)) {
var err error
msg, err = xkp.Open(msg, pubAccXKey)
if err != nil {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Error decrypting auth callout response on account %q: %v", racc.Name, err)
return
}
}
arc, err := jwt.DecodeAuthorizationResponseClaims(string(msg))
if err != nil {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Error decoding auth callout response on account %q: %v", racc.Name, err)
return
}
// FIXME(dlc) - push error through here.
if arc.Error != nil || arc.User == nil {
if arc.Error != nil {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Auth callout violation: %q on account %q", arc.Error.Description, racc.Name)
} else {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Auth callout violation: no user returned on account %q", racc.Name)
}
return
}
// Make sure correct issuer.
var issuer string
if opts.AuthCallout != nil {
issuer = opts.AuthCallout.Issuer
} else {
// Operator mode is who we send the request on unless switching accounts.
issuer = acc.Name
}
// By default issuer needs to match server config or the requesting account in operator mode.
if arc.Issuer != issuer {
if !isOperatorMode {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Wrong issuer for auth callout response on account %q, expected %q got %q", racc.Name, issuer, arc.Issuer)
return
} else if !acc.isAllowedAcount(arc.Issuer) {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Account %q not permitted as valid account option for auth callout for account %q",
arc.Issuer, racc.Name)
return
}
}
// Require the response to have pinned the audience to this server.
if arc.Audience != s.info.ID {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Wrong server audience received for auth callout response on account %q, expected %q got %q",
racc.Name, s.info.ID, arc.Audience)
return
}
juc := arc.User
// Make sure that the user is what we requested.
if juc.Subject != pub {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Expected authorized user of %q but got %q on account %q", pub, juc.Subject, racc.Name)
return
}
allowNow, validFor := validateTimes(juc)
if !allowNow {
c.Errorf("Outside connect times")
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Authorized user on account %q outside of valid connect times", racc.Name)
return
}
allowedConnTypes, err := convertAllowedConnectionTypes(juc.AllowedConnectionTypes)
if err != nil {
c.Debugf("%v", err)
if len(allowedConnTypes) == 0 {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Authorized user on account %q using invalid connection type", racc.Name)
return
}
}
// Apply to this client.
targetAcc := acc
// Check if we are being asked to switch accounts.
if aname := juc.Audience; aname != _EMPTY_ {
targetAcc, err = s.LookupAccount(aname)
if err != nil {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("No valid account %q for auth callout response on account %q: %v", aname, racc.Name, err)
return
}
// In operator mode make sure this account matches the issuer.
if isOperatorMode && aname != arc.Issuer {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Account %q does not match issuer %q", aname, juc.Issuer)
return
}
}
// Build internal user and bind to the targeted account.
nkuser := buildInternalNkeyUser(juc, allowedConnTypes, targetAcc)
if err := c.RegisterNkeyUser(nkuser); err != nil {
respCh <- fmt.Sprintf("Could not register auth callout user: %v", err)
return
}
// See if the response wants to override the username.
if juc.Name != _EMPTY_ {
c.mu.Lock()
c.opts.Username = juc.Name
// Clear any others.
c.opts.Nkey = _EMPTY_
c.pubKey = _EMPTY_
c.opts.Token = _EMPTY_
c.mu.Unlock()
}
// Check if we need to set an auth timer if the user jwt expires.
c.setExpiration(juc.Claims(), validFor)
respCh <- _EMPTY_
}
sub, err := acc.subscribeInternal(reply, processReply)
if err != nil {
errStr = fmt.Sprintf("Error setting up reply subscription for auth request: %v", err)
s.Warnf(errStr)
return false, errStr
}
defer acc.unsubscribeInternal(sub)
// Build our request claims.
claim := jwt.NewAuthorizationRequestClaims(AuthRequestSubject)
// Set expected public user nkey.
claim.UserNkey = pub
s.mu.RLock()
claim.Server = jwt.ServerID{
Name: s.info.Name,
Host: s.info.Host,
ID: s.info.ID,
Version: s.info.Version,
Cluster: s.info.Cluster,
}
s.mu.RUnlock()
// Tags
claim.Server.Tags = s.getOpts().Tags
// Check if we have been requested to encrypt.
if xkp != nil {
claim.Server.XKey = xkey
}
authTimeout := secondsToDuration(s.getOpts().AuthTimeout)
claim.Expires = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(authTimeout)).UTC().Unix()
if opts.AuthCallout != nil {
claim.Audience = opts.AuthCallout.Issuer
} else {
claim.Audience = acc.Name
}
// Grab client info for the request.
c.mu.Lock()
c.fillClientInfo(&claim.ClientInformation)
c.fillConnectOpts(&claim.ConnectOptions)
// If we have a sig in the client opts, fill in nonce.
if claim.ConnectOptions.SignedNonce != _EMPTY_ {
claim.ClientInformation.Nonce = string(c.nonce)
}
// TLS
if c.flags.isSet(handshakeComplete) && c.nc != nil {
var ct jwt.ClientTLS
conn := c.nc.(*tls.Conn)
cs := conn.ConnectionState()
ct.Version = tlsVersion(cs.Version)
ct.Cipher = tlsCipher(cs.CipherSuite)
// Check verified chains.
for _, vs := range cs.VerifiedChains {
var certs []string
for _, c := range vs {
blk := &pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Bytes: c.Raw,
}
certs = append(certs, string(pem.EncodeToMemory(blk)))
}
ct.VerifiedChains = append(ct.VerifiedChains, certs)
}
// If we do not have verified chains put in peer certs.
if len(ct.VerifiedChains) == 0 {
for _, c := range cs.PeerCertificates {
blk := &pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Bytes: c.Raw,
}
ct.Certs = append(ct.Certs, string(pem.EncodeToMemory(blk)))
}
}
claim.TLS = &ct
}
c.mu.Unlock()
b, err := claim.Encode(s.kp)
if err != nil {
errStr = fmt.Sprintf("Error encoding auth request claim on account %q: %v", acc.Name, err)
s.Warnf(errStr)
return false, errStr
}
req := []byte(b)
var hdr map[string]string
// Check if we have been asked to encrypt.
if xkp != nil {
req, err = xkp.Seal([]byte(req), pubAccXKey)
if err != nil {
errStr = fmt.Sprintf("Error encrypting auth request claim on account %q: %v", acc.Name, err)
s.Warnf(errStr)
return false, errStr
}
hdr = map[string]string{AuthRequestXKeyHeader: xkey}
}
// Send out our request.
s.sendInternalAccountMsgWithReply(acc, AuthCalloutSubject, reply, hdr, req, false)
select {
case errStr = <-respCh:
if authorized = errStr == _EMPTY_; !authorized {
s.Warnf(errStr)
}
case <-time.After(authTimeout):
errStr = fmt.Sprintf("Authorization callout response not received in time on account %q", acc.Name)
s.Debugf(errStr)
}
return authorized, errStr
}
// Fill in client information for the request.
// Lock should be held.
func (c *client) fillClientInfo(ci *jwt.ClientInformation) {
if c == nil || (c.kind != CLIENT && c.kind != LEAF && c.kind != JETSTREAM && c.kind != ACCOUNT) {
return
}
// Do it this way to fail to compile if fields are added to jwt.ClientInformation.
*ci = jwt.ClientInformation{
Host: c.host,
ID: c.cid,
User: c.getRawAuthUser(),
Name: c.opts.Name,
Tags: c.tags,
NameTag: c.nameTag,
Kind: c.kindString(),
Type: c.clientTypeString(),
MQTT: c.getMQTTClientID(),
}
}
// Fill in client options.
// Lock should be held.
func (c *client) fillConnectOpts(opts *jwt.ConnectOptions) {
if c == nil || (c.kind != CLIENT && c.kind != LEAF && c.kind != JETSTREAM && c.kind != ACCOUNT) {
return
}
o := c.opts
// Do it this way to fail to compile if fields are added to jwt.ClientInformation.
*opts = jwt.ConnectOptions{
JWT: o.JWT,
Nkey: o.Nkey,
SignedNonce: o.Sig,
Token: o.Token,
Username: o.Username,
Password: o.Password,
Name: o.Name,
Lang: o.Lang,
Version: o.Version,
Protocol: o.Protocol,
}
}