Files
nats-server/server/websocket.go
Ivan Kozlovic 1dba6418ed [ADDED] MQTT Support
This PR introduces native support for MQTT clients. It requires use
of accounts with JetStream enabled. Since as of now clustering is
not available, MQTT will be limited to single instance.

Only QoS 0 and 1 are supported at the moment. MQTT clients can
exchange messages with NATS clients and vice-versa.

Since JetStream is required, accounts with JetStream enabled must
exist in order for an MQTT client to connect to the NATS Server.
The administrator can limit the users that can use MQTT with the
allowed_connection_types option in the user section. For instance:
```
accounts {
  mqtt {
    users [
      {user: all, password: pwd, allowed_connection_types: ["STANDARD", "WEBSOCKET", "MQTT"]}
      {user: mqtt_only, password: pwd, allowed_connection_types: "MQTT"}
    ]
    jetstream: enabled
  }
}
```
The "mqtt_only" can only be used for MQTT connections, which the user
"all" accepts standard, websocket and MQTT clients.

Here is what a configuration to enable MQTT looks like:
```
mqtt {
  # Specify a host and port to listen for websocket connections
  #
  # listen: "host:port"

  # It can also be configured with individual parameters,
  # namely host and port.
  #
  # host: "hostname"
  port: 1883

  # TLS configuration section
  #
  # tls {
  #  cert_file: "/path/to/cert.pem"
  #  key_file: "/path/to/key.pem"
  #  ca_file: "/path/to/ca.pem"
  #
  #  # Time allowed for the TLS handshake to complete
  #  timeout: 2.0
  #
  #  # Takes the user name from the certificate
  #  #
  #  # verify_an_map: true
  #}

  # Authentication override. Here are possible options.
  #
  # authorization {
  #   # Simple username/password
  #   #
  #   user: "some_user_name"
  #   password: "some_password"
  #
  #   # Token. The server will check the MQTT's password in the connect
  #   # protocol against this token.
  #   #
  #   # token: "some_token"
  #
  #   # Time allowed for the client to send the MQTT connect protocol
  #   # after the TCP connection is established.
  #   #
  #   timeout: 2.0
  #}

  # If an MQTT client connects and does not provide a username/password and
  # this option is set, the server will use this client (and therefore account).
  #
  # no_auth_user: "some_user_name"

  # This is the time after which the server will redeliver a QoS 1 message
  # sent to a subscription that has not acknowledged (PUBACK) the message.
  # The default is 30 seconds.
  #
  # ack_wait: "1m"

  # This limits the number of QoS1 messages sent to a session without receiving
  # acknowledgement (PUBACK) from that session. MQTT specification defines
  # a packet identifier as an unsigned int 16, which means that the maximum
  # value is 65535. The default value is 1024.
  #
  # max_ack_pending: 100
}
```

Signed-off-by: Ivan Kozlovic <ivan@synadia.com>
2020-11-30 20:08:44 -07:00

1035 lines
29 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2020 The NATS Authors
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package server
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
)
type wsOpCode int
const (
// From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-5.2
wsTextMessage = wsOpCode(1)
wsBinaryMessage = wsOpCode(2)
wsCloseMessage = wsOpCode(8)
wsPingMessage = wsOpCode(9)
wsPongMessage = wsOpCode(10)
wsFinalBit = 1 << 7
wsRsv1Bit = 1 << 6 // Used for compression, from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7692#section-6
wsRsv2Bit = 1 << 5
wsRsv3Bit = 1 << 4
wsMaskBit = 1 << 7
wsContinuationFrame = 0
wsMaxFrameHeaderSize = 10 // For a server-to-client frame
wsMaxControlPayloadSize = 125
wsFrameSizeForBrowsers = 4096 // From experiment, webrowsers behave better with limited frame size
// From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-11.7
wsCloseStatusNormalClosure = 1000
wsCloseStatusGoingAway = 1001
wsCloseStatusProtocolError = 1002
wsCloseStatusUnsupportedData = 1003
wsCloseStatusNoStatusReceived = 1005
wsCloseStatusAbnormalClosure = 1006
wsCloseStatusInvalidPayloadData = 1007
wsCloseStatusPolicyViolation = 1008
wsCloseStatusMessageTooBig = 1009
wsCloseStatusInternalSrvError = 1011
wsCloseStatusTLSHandshake = 1015
wsFirstFrame = true
wsContFrame = false
wsFinalFrame = true
wsCompressedFrame = true
wsUncompressedFrame = false
)
var decompressorPool sync.Pool
// From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-1.3
var wsGUID = []byte("258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11")
type websocket struct {
frames net.Buffers
fs int64
closeMsg []byte
compress bool
closeSent bool
browser bool
compressor *flate.Writer
cookieJwt string
}
type srvWebsocket struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
server *http.Server
listener net.Listener
tls bool
allowedOrigins map[string]*allowedOrigin // host will be the key
sameOrigin bool
connectURLs []string
connectURLsMap refCountedUrlSet
authOverride bool // indicate if there is auth override in websocket config
}
type allowedOrigin struct {
scheme string
port string
}
type wsUpgradeResult struct {
conn net.Conn
ws *websocket
}
type wsReadInfo struct {
rem int
fs bool
ff bool
fc bool
mkpos byte
mkey [4]byte
buf []byte
}
func (r *wsReadInfo) init() {
r.fs, r.ff = true, true
}
// Returns a slice containing `needed` bytes from the given buffer `buf`
// starting at position `pos`, and possibly read from the given reader `r`.
// When bytes are present in `buf`, the `pos` is incremented by the number
// of bytes found up to `needed` and the new position is returned. If not
// enough bytes are found, the bytes found in `buf` are copied to the returned
// slice and the remaning bytes are read from `r`.
func wsGet(r io.Reader, buf []byte, pos, needed int) ([]byte, int, error) {
avail := len(buf) - pos
if avail >= needed {
return buf[pos : pos+needed], pos + needed, nil
}
b := make([]byte, needed)
start := copy(b, buf[pos:])
for start != needed {
n, err := r.Read(b[start:cap(b)])
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
start += n
}
return b, pos + avail, nil
}
// Returns a slice of byte slices corresponding to payload of websocket frames.
// The byte slice `buf` is filled with bytes from the connection's read loop.
// This function will decode the frame headers and unmask the payload(s).
// It is possible that the returned slices point to the given `buf` slice, so
// `buf` should not be overwritten until the returned slices have been parsed.
//
// Client lock MUST NOT be held on entry.
func (c *client) wsRead(r *wsReadInfo, ior io.Reader, buf []byte) ([][]byte, error) {
var (
bufs [][]byte
tmpBuf []byte
err error
pos int
max = len(buf)
)
for pos != max {
if r.fs {
b0 := buf[pos]
frameType := wsOpCode(b0 & 0xF)
final := b0&wsFinalBit != 0
compressed := b0&wsRsv1Bit != 0
pos++
tmpBuf, pos, err = wsGet(ior, buf, pos, 1)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
b1 := tmpBuf[0]
// Clients MUST set the mask bit. If not set, reject.
if b1&wsMaskBit == 0 {
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError("mask bit missing")
}
// Store size in case it is < 125
r.rem = int(b1 & 0x7F)
switch frameType {
case wsPingMessage, wsPongMessage, wsCloseMessage:
if r.rem > wsMaxControlPayloadSize {
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError(
fmt.Sprintf("control frame length bigger than maximum allowed of %v bytes",
wsMaxControlPayloadSize))
}
if !final {
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError("control frame does not have final bit set")
}
case wsTextMessage, wsBinaryMessage:
if !r.ff {
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError("new message started before final frame for previous message was received")
}
r.ff = final
r.fc = compressed
case wsContinuationFrame:
// Compressed bit must be only set in the first frame
if r.ff || compressed {
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError("invalid continuation frame")
}
r.ff = final
default:
return bufs, c.wsHandleProtocolError(fmt.Sprintf("unknown opcode %v", frameType))
}
switch r.rem {
case 126:
tmpBuf, pos, err = wsGet(ior, buf, pos, 2)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
r.rem = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(tmpBuf))
case 127:
tmpBuf, pos, err = wsGet(ior, buf, pos, 8)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
r.rem = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(tmpBuf))
}
// Read masking key
tmpBuf, pos, err = wsGet(ior, buf, pos, 4)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
copy(r.mkey[:], tmpBuf)
r.mkpos = 0
// Handle control messages in place...
if wsIsControlFrame(frameType) {
pos, err = c.wsHandleControlFrame(r, frameType, ior, buf, pos)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
continue
}
// Done with the frame header
r.fs = false
}
if pos < max {
var b []byte
var n int
n = r.rem
if pos+n > max {
n = max - pos
}
b = buf[pos : pos+n]
pos += n
r.rem -= n
if r.fc {
r.buf = append(r.buf, b...)
b = r.buf
}
if !r.fc || r.rem == 0 {
r.unmask(b)
if r.fc {
// As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7692#section-7.2.2
// add 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff and then a final block so that flate reader
// does not report unexpected EOF.
b = append(b, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff)
br := bytes.NewBuffer(b)
d, _ := decompressorPool.Get().(io.ReadCloser)
if d == nil {
d = flate.NewReader(br)
} else {
d.(flate.Resetter).Reset(br, nil)
}
b, err = ioutil.ReadAll(d)
decompressorPool.Put(d)
if err != nil {
return bufs, err
}
}
bufs = append(bufs, b)
if r.rem == 0 {
r.fs, r.fc, r.buf = true, false, nil
}
}
}
}
return bufs, nil
}
// Handles the PING, PONG and CLOSE websocket control frames.
//
// Client lock MUST NOT be held on entry.
func (c *client) wsHandleControlFrame(r *wsReadInfo, frameType wsOpCode, nc io.Reader, buf []byte, pos int) (int, error) {
var payload []byte
var err error
statusPos := pos
if r.rem > 0 {
payload, pos, err = wsGet(nc, buf, pos, r.rem)
if err != nil {
return pos, err
}
r.unmask(payload)
r.rem = 0
}
switch frameType {
case wsCloseMessage:
status := wsCloseStatusNoStatusReceived
body := ""
// If there is a payload, it should contain 2 unsigned bytes
// that represent the status code and then optional payload.
if len(payload) >= 2 {
status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[statusPos : statusPos+2]))
body = string(buf[statusPos+2 : statusPos+len(payload)])
if body != "" && !utf8.ValidString(body) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-5.5.1
// If body is present, it must be a valid utf8
status = wsCloseStatusInvalidPayloadData
body = "invalid utf8 body in close frame"
}
}
c.wsEnqueueControlMessage(wsCloseMessage, wsCreateCloseMessage(status, body))
// Return io.EOF so that readLoop will close the connection as ClientClosed
// after processing pending buffers.
return pos, io.EOF
case wsPingMessage:
c.wsEnqueueControlMessage(wsPongMessage, payload)
case wsPongMessage:
// Nothing to do..
}
return pos, nil
}
// Unmask the given slice.
func (r *wsReadInfo) unmask(buf []byte) {
p := int(r.mkpos)
if len(buf) < 16 {
for i := 0; i < len(buf); i++ {
buf[i] ^= r.mkey[p&3]
p++
}
r.mkpos = byte(p & 3)
return
}
var k [8]byte
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
k[i] = r.mkey[(p+i)&3]
}
km := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(k[:])
n := (len(buf) / 8) * 8
for i := 0; i < n; i += 8 {
tmp := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(buf[i : i+8])
tmp ^= km
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[i:], tmp)
}
buf = buf[n:]
for i := 0; i < len(buf); i++ {
buf[i] ^= r.mkey[p&3]
p++
}
r.mkpos = byte(p & 3)
}
// Returns true if the op code corresponds to a control frame.
func wsIsControlFrame(frameType wsOpCode) bool {
return frameType >= wsCloseMessage
}
// Create the frame header.
// Encodes the frame type and optional compression flag, and the size of the payload.
func wsCreateFrameHeader(compressed bool, frameType wsOpCode, l int) []byte {
fh := make([]byte, wsMaxFrameHeaderSize)
n := wsFillFrameHeader(fh, wsFirstFrame, wsFinalFrame, compressed, frameType, l)
return fh[:n]
}
func wsFillFrameHeader(fh []byte, first, final, compressed bool, frameType wsOpCode, l int) int {
var n int
var b byte
if first {
b = byte(frameType)
}
if final {
b |= wsFinalBit
}
if compressed {
b |= wsRsv1Bit
}
switch {
case l <= 125:
n = 2
fh[0] = b
fh[1] = byte(l)
case l < 65536:
n = 4
fh[0] = b
fh[1] = 126
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(fh[2:], uint16(l))
default:
n = 10
fh[0] = b
fh[1] = 127
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(fh[2:], uint64(l))
}
return n
}
// Invokes wsEnqueueControlMessageLocked under client lock.
//
// Client lock MUST NOT be held on entry
func (c *client) wsEnqueueControlMessage(controlMsg wsOpCode, payload []byte) {
c.mu.Lock()
c.wsEnqueueControlMessageLocked(controlMsg, payload)
c.mu.Unlock()
}
// Enqueues a websocket control message.
// If the control message is a wsCloseMessage, then marks this client
// has having sent the close message (since only one should be sent).
// This will prevent the generic closeConnection() to enqueue one.
//
// Client lock held on entry.
func (c *client) wsEnqueueControlMessageLocked(controlMsg wsOpCode, payload []byte) {
// Control messages are never compressed and their size will be
// less than wsMaxControlPayloadSize, which means the frame header
// will be only 2 bytes.
cm := make([]byte, 2+len(payload))
wsFillFrameHeader(cm, wsFirstFrame, wsFinalFrame, wsUncompressedFrame, controlMsg, len(payload))
// Note that payload is optional.
if len(payload) > 0 {
copy(cm[2:], payload)
}
c.out.pb += int64(len(cm))
if controlMsg == wsCloseMessage {
// We can't add the close message to the frames buffers
// now. It will be done on a flushOutbound() when there
// are no more pending buffers to send.
c.ws.closeSent = true
c.ws.closeMsg = cm
} else {
c.ws.frames = append(c.ws.frames, cm)
c.ws.fs += int64(len(cm))
}
c.flushSignal()
}
// Enqueues a websocket close message with a status mapped from the given `reason`.
//
// Client lock held on entry
func (c *client) wsEnqueueCloseMessage(reason ClosedState) {
var status int
switch reason {
case ClientClosed:
status = wsCloseStatusNormalClosure
case AuthenticationTimeout, AuthenticationViolation, SlowConsumerPendingBytes, SlowConsumerWriteDeadline,
MaxAccountConnectionsExceeded, MaxConnectionsExceeded, MaxControlLineExceeded, MaxSubscriptionsExceeded,
MissingAccount, AuthenticationExpired, Revocation:
status = wsCloseStatusPolicyViolation
case TLSHandshakeError:
status = wsCloseStatusTLSHandshake
case ParseError, ProtocolViolation, BadClientProtocolVersion:
status = wsCloseStatusProtocolError
case MaxPayloadExceeded:
status = wsCloseStatusMessageTooBig
case ServerShutdown:
status = wsCloseStatusGoingAway
case WriteError, ReadError, StaleConnection:
status = wsCloseStatusAbnormalClosure
default:
status = wsCloseStatusInternalSrvError
}
body := wsCreateCloseMessage(status, reason.String())
c.wsEnqueueControlMessageLocked(wsCloseMessage, body)
}
// Create and then enqueue a close message with a protocol error and the
// given message. This is invoked when parsing websocket frames.
//
// Lock MUST NOT be held on entry.
func (c *client) wsHandleProtocolError(message string) error {
buf := wsCreateCloseMessage(wsCloseStatusProtocolError, message)
c.wsEnqueueControlMessage(wsCloseMessage, buf)
return fmt.Errorf(message)
}
// Create a close message with the given `status` and `body`.
// If the `body` is more than the maximum allows control frame payload size,
// it is truncated and "..." is added at the end (as a hint that message
// is not complete).
func wsCreateCloseMessage(status int, body string) []byte {
// Since a control message payload is limited in size, we
// will limit the text and add trailing "..." if truncated.
// The body of a Close Message must be preceded with 2 bytes,
// so take that into account for limiting the body length.
if len(body) > wsMaxControlPayloadSize-2 {
body = body[:wsMaxControlPayloadSize-5]
body += "..."
}
buf := make([]byte, 2+len(body))
// We need to have a 2 byte unsigned int that represents the error status code
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-5.5.1
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[:2], uint16(status))
copy(buf[2:], []byte(body))
return buf
}
// Process websocket client handshake. On success, returns the raw net.Conn that
// will be used to create a *client object.
// Invoked from the HTTP server listening on websocket port.
func (s *Server) wsUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*wsUpgradeResult, error) {
opts := s.getOpts()
// From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-4.2.1
// Point 1.
if r.Method != "GET" {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "request method must be GET")
}
// Point 2.
if r.Host == "" {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "'Host' missing in request")
}
// Point 3.
if !wsHeaderContains(r.Header, "Upgrade", "websocket") {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid value for header 'Upgrade'")
}
// Point 4.
if !wsHeaderContains(r.Header, "Connection", "Upgrade") {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid value for header 'Connection'")
}
// Point 5.
key := r.Header.Get("Sec-Websocket-Key")
if key == "" {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "key missing")
}
// Point 6.
if !wsHeaderContains(r.Header, "Sec-Websocket-Version", "13") {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid version")
}
// Others are optional
// Point 7.
if err := s.websocket.checkOrigin(r); err != nil {
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusForbidden, fmt.Sprintf("origin not allowed: %v", err))
}
// Point 8.
// We don't have protocols, so ignore.
// Point 9.
// Extensions, only support for compression at the moment
compress := opts.Websocket.Compression
if compress {
compress = wsClientSupportsCompression(r.Header)
}
h := w.(http.Hijacker)
conn, brw, err := h.Hijack()
if err != nil {
if conn != nil {
conn.Close()
}
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
if brw.Reader.Buffered() > 0 {
conn.Close()
return nil, wsReturnHTTPError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "client sent data before handshake is complete")
}
var buf [1024]byte
p := buf[:0]
// From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-4.2.2
p = append(p, "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\nSec-WebSocket-Accept: "...)
p = append(p, wsAcceptKey(key)...)
p = append(p, _CRLF_...)
if compress {
p = append(p, "Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: permessage-deflate; server_no_context_takeover; client_no_context_takeover\r\n"...)
}
p = append(p, _CRLF_...)
if _, err = conn.Write(p); err != nil {
conn.Close()
return nil, err
}
// If there was a deadline set for the handshake, clear it now.
if opts.Websocket.HandshakeTimeout > 0 {
conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{})
}
ws := &websocket{compress: compress}
// Indicate if this is likely coming from a browser.
if ua := r.Header.Get("User-Agent"); ua != "" && strings.HasPrefix(ua, "Mozilla/") {
ws.browser = true
}
if opts.Websocket.JWTCookie != "" {
if c, err := r.Cookie(opts.Websocket.JWTCookie); err == nil && c != nil {
ws.cookieJwt = c.Value
}
}
return &wsUpgradeResult{conn: conn, ws: ws}, nil
}
// Returns true if the header named `name` contains a token with value `value`.
func wsHeaderContains(header http.Header, name string, value string) bool {
for _, s := range header[name] {
tokens := strings.Split(s, ",")
for _, t := range tokens {
t = strings.Trim(t, " \t")
if strings.EqualFold(t, value) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// Return true if the client has "permessage-deflate" in its extensions.
func wsClientSupportsCompression(header http.Header) bool {
for _, extensionList := range header["Sec-Websocket-Extensions"] {
extensions := strings.Split(extensionList, ",")
for _, extension := range extensions {
extension = strings.Trim(extension, " \t")
params := strings.Split(extension, ";")
for _, p := range params {
p = strings.Trim(p, " \t")
if strings.EqualFold(p, "permessage-deflate") {
return true
}
}
}
}
return false
}
// Send an HTTP error with the given `status`` to the given http response writer `w`.
// Return an error created based on the `reason` string.
func wsReturnHTTPError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, reason string) error {
err := fmt.Errorf("websocket handshake error: %s", reason)
w.Header().Set("Sec-Websocket-Version", "13")
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(status), status)
return err
}
// If the server is configured to accept any origin, then this function returns
// `nil` without checking if the Origin is present and valid.
// Otherwise, this will check that the Origin matches the same origine or
// any origin in the allowed list.
func (w *srvWebsocket) checkOrigin(r *http.Request) error {
w.mu.RLock()
checkSame := w.sameOrigin
listEmpty := len(w.allowedOrigins) == 0
w.mu.RUnlock()
if !checkSame && listEmpty {
return nil
}
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if origin == "" {
origin = r.Header.Get("Sec-Websocket-Origin")
}
if origin == "" {
return errors.New("origin not provided")
}
u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(origin)
if err != nil {
return err
}
oh, op, err := wsGetHostAndPort(u.Scheme == "https", u.Host)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If checking same origin, compare with the http's request's Host.
if checkSame {
rh, rp, err := wsGetHostAndPort(r.TLS != nil, r.Host)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if oh != rh || op != rp {
return errors.New("not same origin")
}
// I guess it is possible to have cases where one wants to check
// same origin, but also that the origin is in the allowed list.
// So continue with the next check.
}
if !listEmpty {
w.mu.RLock()
ao := w.allowedOrigins[oh]
w.mu.RUnlock()
if ao == nil || u.Scheme != ao.scheme || op != ao.port {
return errors.New("not in the allowed list")
}
}
return nil
}
func wsGetHostAndPort(tls bool, hostport string) (string, string, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)
if err != nil {
// If error is missing port, then use defaults based on the scheme
if ae, ok := err.(*net.AddrError); ok && strings.Contains(ae.Err, "missing port") {
err = nil
host = hostport
if tls {
port = "443"
} else {
port = "80"
}
}
}
return strings.ToLower(host), port, err
}
// Concatenate the key sent by the client with the GUID, then computes the SHA1 hash
// and returns it as a based64 encoded string.
func wsAcceptKey(key string) string {
h := sha1.New()
h.Write([]byte(key))
h.Write(wsGUID)
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
}
// Validate the websocket related options.
func validateWebsocketOptions(o *Options) error {
wo := &o.Websocket
// If no port is defined, we don't care about other options
if wo.Port == 0 {
return nil
}
// Enforce TLS... unless NoTLS is set to true.
if wo.TLSConfig == nil && !wo.NoTLS {
return errors.New("websocket requires TLS configuration")
}
// Make sure that allowed origins, if specified, can be parsed.
for _, ao := range wo.AllowedOrigins {
if _, err := url.Parse(ao); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse allowed origin: %v", err)
}
}
// If there is a NoAuthUser, we need to have Users defined and
// the user to be present.
if wo.NoAuthUser != _EMPTY_ {
if err := validateNoAuthUser(o, wo.NoAuthUser); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Token/Username not possible if there are users/nkeys
if len(o.Users) > 0 || len(o.Nkeys) > 0 {
if wo.Username != _EMPTY_ {
return fmt.Errorf("websocket authentication username not compatible with presence of users/nkeys")
}
if wo.Token != _EMPTY_ {
return fmt.Errorf("websocket authentication token not compatible with presence of users/nkeys")
}
}
// Using JWT requires Trusted Keys
if wo.JWTCookie != "" {
if len(o.TrustedOperators) == 0 && len(o.TrustedKeys) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("trusted operators or trusted keys configuration is required for JWT authentication via cookie %q", wo.JWTCookie)
}
}
return nil
}
// Creates or updates the existing map
func (s *Server) wsSetOriginOptions(o *WebsocketOpts) {
ws := &s.websocket
ws.mu.Lock()
defer ws.mu.Unlock()
// Copy over the option's same origin boolean
ws.sameOrigin = o.SameOrigin
// Reset the map. Will help for config reload if/when we support it.
ws.allowedOrigins = nil
if o.AllowedOrigins == nil {
return
}
for _, ao := range o.AllowedOrigins {
// We have previously checked (during options validation) that the urls
// are parseable, but if we get an error, report and skip.
u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(ao)
if err != nil {
s.Errorf("error parsing allowed origin: %v", err)
continue
}
h, p, _ := wsGetHostAndPort(u.Scheme == "https", u.Host)
if ws.allowedOrigins == nil {
ws.allowedOrigins = make(map[string]*allowedOrigin, len(o.AllowedOrigins))
}
ws.allowedOrigins[h] = &allowedOrigin{scheme: u.Scheme, port: p}
}
}
// Given the websocket options, we check if any auth configuration
// has been provided. If so, possibly create users/nkey users and
// store them in s.websocket.users/nkeys.
// Also update a boolean that indicates if auth is required for
// websocket clients.
// Server lock is held on entry.
func (s *Server) wsConfigAuth(opts *WebsocketOpts) {
ws := &s.websocket
// If any of those is specified, we consider that there is an override.
ws.authOverride = opts.Username != _EMPTY_ || opts.Token != _EMPTY_ || opts.NoAuthUser != _EMPTY_
}
func (s *Server) startWebsocketServer() {
sopts := s.getOpts()
o := &sopts.Websocket
s.wsSetOriginOptions(o)
var hl net.Listener
var proto string
var err error
port := o.Port
if port == -1 {
port = 0
}
hp := net.JoinHostPort(o.Host, strconv.Itoa(port))
// We are enforcing (when validating the options) the use of TLS, but the
// code was originally supporting both modes. The reason for TLS only is
// that we expect users to send JWTs with bearer tokens and we want to
// avoid the possibility of it being "intercepted".
s.mu.Lock()
if s.shutdown {
s.mu.Unlock()
return
}
// Do not check o.NoTLS here. If a TLS configuration is available, use it,
// regardless of NoTLS. If we don't have a TLS config, it means that the
// user has configured NoTLS because otherwise the server would have failed
// to start due to options validation.
if o.TLSConfig != nil {
proto = "wss"
config := o.TLSConfig.Clone()
hl, err = tls.Listen("tcp", hp, config)
} else {
proto = "ws"
hl, err = net.Listen("tcp", hp)
}
if err != nil {
s.mu.Unlock()
s.Fatalf("Unable to listen for websocket connections: %v", err)
return
}
s.Noticef("Listening for websocket clients on %s://%s:%d", proto, o.Host, port)
if proto == "ws" {
s.Warnf("Websocket not configured with TLS. DO NOT USE IN PRODUCTION!")
}
s.websocket.tls = proto == "wss"
if port == 0 {
s.opts.Websocket.Port = hl.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
}
s.Noticef("Listening for websocket clients on %s://%s:%d", proto, o.Host, port)
s.websocket.connectURLs, err = s.getConnectURLs(o.Advertise, o.Host, o.Port)
if err != nil {
s.Fatalf("Unable to get websocket connect URLs: %v", err)
hl.Close()
s.mu.Unlock()
return
}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
res, err := s.wsUpgrade(w, r)
if err != nil {
s.Errorf(err.Error())
return
}
s.createClient(res.conn, res.ws, nil)
})
hs := &http.Server{
Addr: hp,
Handler: mux,
ReadTimeout: o.HandshakeTimeout,
ErrorLog: log.New(&wsCaptureHTTPServerLog{s}, "", 0),
}
s.websocket.server = hs
s.websocket.listener = hl
go func() {
if err := hs.Serve(hl); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
s.Fatalf("websocket listener error: %v", err)
}
if s.isLameDuckMode() {
// Signal that we are not accepting new clients
s.ldmCh <- true
// Now wait for the Shutdown...
<-s.quitCh
return
}
s.done <- true
}()
s.mu.Unlock()
}
type wsCaptureHTTPServerLog struct {
s *Server
}
func (cl *wsCaptureHTTPServerLog) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
var buf [128]byte
var b = buf[:0]
copy(b, []byte("websocket :"))
offset := 0
if bytes.HasPrefix(p, []byte("http:")) {
offset = 6
}
b = append(b, p[offset:]...)
cl.s.Errorf(string(b))
return len(p), nil
}
func (c *client) wsCollapsePtoNB() (net.Buffers, int64) {
var nb net.Buffers
var total = 0
var mfs = 0
if c.ws.browser {
mfs = wsFrameSizeForBrowsers
}
if len(c.out.p) > 0 {
p := c.out.p
c.out.p = nil
nb = append(c.out.nb, p)
} else if len(c.out.nb) > 0 {
nb = c.out.nb
}
// Start with possible already framed buffers (that we could have
// got from partials or control messages such as ws pings or pongs).
bufs := c.ws.frames
if c.ws.compress && len(nb) > 0 {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
cp := c.ws.compressor
if cp == nil {
c.ws.compressor, _ = flate.NewWriter(buf, flate.BestSpeed)
cp = c.ws.compressor
} else {
cp.Reset(buf)
}
var usz int
var csz int
for _, b := range nb {
usz += len(b)
cp.Write(b)
}
cp.Close()
b := buf.Bytes()
p := b[:len(b)-4]
if mfs > 0 && len(p) > mfs {
for first, final := true, false; len(p) > 0; first = false {
lp := len(p)
if lp > mfs {
lp = mfs
} else {
final = true
}
fh := make([]byte, wsMaxFrameHeaderSize)
n := wsFillFrameHeader(fh, first, final, wsCompressedFrame, wsBinaryMessage, lp)
bufs = append(bufs, fh[:n], p[:lp])
csz += n + lp
p = p[lp:]
}
} else {
h := wsCreateFrameHeader(true, wsBinaryMessage, len(p))
bufs = append(bufs, h, p)
csz = len(h) + len(p)
}
// Add to pb the compressed data size (including headers), but
// remove the original uncompressed data size that was added
// during the queueing.
c.out.pb += int64(csz) - int64(usz)
c.ws.fs += int64(csz)
} else if len(nb) > 0 {
if mfs > 0 {
// We are limiting the frame size.
startFrame := func() int {
bufs = append(bufs, make([]byte, wsMaxFrameHeaderSize))
return len(bufs) - 1
}
endFrame := func(idx, size int) {
n := wsFillFrameHeader(bufs[idx], wsFirstFrame, wsFinalFrame, wsUncompressedFrame, wsBinaryMessage, size)
c.out.pb += int64(n)
c.ws.fs += int64(n + size)
bufs[idx] = bufs[idx][:n]
}
fhIdx := startFrame()
for i := 0; i < len(nb); i++ {
b := nb[i]
if total+len(b) <= mfs {
bufs = append(bufs, b)
total += len(b)
continue
}
for len(b) > 0 {
endFrame(fhIdx, total)
total = len(b)
if total >= mfs {
total = mfs
}
fhIdx = startFrame()
bufs = append(bufs, b[:total])
b = b[total:]
}
}
if total > 0 {
endFrame(fhIdx, total)
}
} else {
// If there is no limit on the frame size, create a single frame for
// all pending buffers.
for _, b := range nb {
total += len(b)
}
wsfh := wsCreateFrameHeader(false, wsBinaryMessage, total)
c.out.pb += int64(len(wsfh))
bufs = append(bufs, wsfh)
bufs = append(bufs, nb...)
c.ws.fs += int64(len(wsfh) + total)
}
}
if len(c.ws.closeMsg) > 0 {
bufs = append(bufs, c.ws.closeMsg)
c.ws.fs += int64(len(c.ws.closeMsg))
c.ws.closeMsg = nil
}
c.ws.frames = nil
return bufs, c.ws.fs
}